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LEGAL AND PROFESSIONAL
BASES FOR LICENSURE
TESTING
William A. Mehrens
Michigan State University

In this chapter the author presents the legal setting for licensure testing, I
discusses the role of various professional standards and codes (i.e., the EEOC
Uniform Guidelines, 1978, and the AERA/APA/NCME Standards, 1985), presents some of the pertinent rulings from several court decisions, and makes
inferences abo ut future changes in professional standards and their potential
impact on licensure test development.
There necessarily is some minor overlap with the material in this chapter and
some other chapters in this book. There is a brief discussion of the differences
between licensure, certification. and employment testing and how those differences relate to the professional standards and court cases. It is necessary to
mention some concepts such as task analysis, validity, and cut scores when
discussing the professional standards and the court cases. However, these concepts
are not dealt with in the depth that occurs in later chapters.

THE LEGAL SETTING
Licensure and certification tests are high-stakes tests and those considering
using or constructing such tests should be aware of previous case law regarding
Portions of this chapter have been adapted from an article by Mehrens, W .A . and Popham,
W.J . (1992). How to evaluate the legal defensibil ity of hi gh -stakes tests. Applied Measurement in
Education, 5(3),265-283. Permission of the publ isher and Dr. Popham to use those portions has been
obtained . Spec ial appreciation is given to Dr. Kara Schmitt and Susan Boston for their ass istance in
tracking clown many of the lega l documents used in writing this chapter.
'The words "test" and "testing" are to be interpreted broadly as inc luding a variety of assessment
procedures.
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such testing. Some generic legal issues are discussed first. In subsequent sections,
the various professional standards and some court decisions are presented.

Generic Legal Issues
Existing case law is based on constitutional requirements- primarily the 14th
Amendment- and statutory requirements- primarily Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act.

Constitutional Requirements: The 14th Amendment
Two basic requirements of the U.S. Constitution's 14th Amendment are
discussed: equal protection and due process. For a plaintiff to win under the equal
protection analysis, it must be shown that there was intent to discriminate. In
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. (1977) ,
the court stated that the following factors could be considered in establishing
discriminatory intent: (a) historical background, (b) the specific sequence of events
leading up to the challenged decision, (c) departures from normal procedural
sequences, and (d) the legislative or administrative history. Nevertheless, to prove
discriminatory intent, one court has ruled that it must be shown that the user of the
test "selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ' because of'
not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group" (Personnel
Administrator v. Feeney, 1979, at 4656). Another court has stated that:
An action does not violate the equal protection clause simply because the decision
maker knows that it wi ll have a disparate impact on racial or ethnic groups. (United
States v. LULAC, 1986, p. 646)
It is difficult to prove intent. As a consequence, most plaintiffs would prefer
basing their cases on the Civil Rights Acts, which do not require proof of
discriminatory motive.
The due process provisions of the Constitution relate to substantive and procedural due process. Substantive due process requires a legitimate relationship between
a requirement and the purpose. This legitimate relationship is easier to establish than
the business necessity requirement of the Civil Rights Acts. In fact, for licensure and
certification challenges Herbsleb, Sales, and Overcast (1985) concluded that:
the rationality standard is so lenient that we were unable to find a single case where
an examination was successfully challenged on this basi s. (p. 1169)
Procedural due process requires fairness in the way things are done. In testing
cases, this means that there must be advance notice of the requirement, an
opportunity for hearings/appeals, and that the hearings must be conducted fairly. A
licensure or certification testing program should not be implemented without
paying careful attention to these procedures. It should be pointed out that if a
plaintiff wins on procedural grounds, he/she does not necessarily get a license.
However, some additional procedure- such as a hearing- must be applied.

Statutory Requirements: The Civil Rights Acts
The 1964 Civil Rights Act was a general federal statute prohibiting discrimination in employment. When first enacted it pertained to employment in the private
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sector, but it was extended in 1972 to employment practices in educational
institutions. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was passed to reverse parts of several
U.S . Supreme Court decisions that were unfavorable to employment complaints.
There is some debate about whether licensure and certification procedures are to be
considered employment practices and whether the Civil Rights Acts apply to such
processes. This is discussed in more detail later.
The Acts prohibit two kinds of discrimination: disparate treatment and
disparate impact. Disparate treatment involves overt discrimination- where employers treat some people less favorably than others because of their race, color,
religion, or national origin. The plaintiff has the initial burden of establish ing that
disparate treatment occurred. Most case law related to the Civi l Rights Acts
regarding testing is based on disparate impact rather than disparate treatment.
Disparate impact does not require evidence of subjective discriminatory intent,
but refers to employment practices that are ostensibly neutral in their treatment, yet
result in protected groups being hired at a lower rate than unprotected groups. It
is the plaintiff' s responsibility to show disparate impact, but it is the responsibility
of the user (e.g., employer or licensure board) to maintain documentation regarding
disparate impact (see Chance v. Board of Examiners, 1971, 1972). The Civ il Rights
Act of 1991 states that the plaintiff must demonstrate that each particular challenged process (e.g., written test, subtest, oral exam, performance appraisal) causes
a disparate impact unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the decision-making
elements cannot be analyzed separately. (This emphasis on each component may
have implications for scoring procedures-should one use part scores or total
scores- and conjunctive versus compensatory decision making.)
There ex ists some debate about what statistics to use and what groups should
be considered in the statistical analysis to show disparate impact. Regarding the
relevant groups, the general conclusion is that the proper comparison is between the
proportions of the groups in the qualified population in the relevant job market
(Wards Cove Packing Co., 1989; Civi l Rights Act of 1991). For the statistical
analysis, the Uniform Guidelines 2 (EEOC, 1978) suggest a four-fifths rule. This
means that the percent of protected group applicants hired should be at least 80%
of the percent of unprotected group applicants hired. Others prefer a statistical
inference test to discern if an observed disparity between protected and unprotected
groups is statistically sign ificant (e.g., Hazelwood, 1977). Because the issue of
impact is not one of test construction and use, per se, we will not discuss it further.
However, interested readers may wish to consult the literature concerning this issue
(see, e.g., Meier, Sacks, & Zabell , 1984).
In cases where there has been a showing of disparate impact on members of
a protected group for a particular employment practice, the burden of proof shifts
to the defendants and requires them to demonstrate that the use of the test (or other
assessment procedure) constitutes a business necessity. (Employers do not need to
defend those parts of the process that do not show disparate impact.) This means
that the particular challenged tests (or subtests) must be shown to be job-related and
' The Guidelines is a s in gle work. However, for smoothness in reading it will be treated as a
plural noun.
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to have been professionally developed. If a test is job-related and professionally
developed, it can be used even if there is disparate impact unless the plaintiffs can
show that there exists an equally effective alternative selection procedure that results
in less adverse impact. Although there were some Supreme Court decisions in 1988
and 1989 that lessened the burden of proof of the defendants to show business
necessity, the 1991 Civil Rights Act reestablished this requirement.

Title VII and Employment, Licensure, and Certification Testing
As discussed in the previous chapter, the purposes of licensure and certification
tests are different from the purpose of employment tests. The function of licensure
is to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public. There is some debate
about whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act applies to licensure tests. Some
attorneys (e.g., Phillips, 1991; Pyburn, 1990; Rebell, 1986) have suggested that
Title VII does not apply to state licensing agencies and their tests. Rulings in bar
examination cases such as Tyler v. Vickery (1975, 1976) and Woodward v. Virginia
Board of Bar Examiners (1976, 1979) support this position. For example, one court
stated that:
T itle VII does not app ly by its terms ... because the Georgia Board of Bar Examiners
is neither an "employer," an "employment agency," nor a " labor organization"
within the meaning of the statute. (TyLer v. Vickery, 1976, p. 1096)

Smith and Hambleton (1990) concluded that:
Most courts have been unwilling to extend Title VII ... to licensure examinations.
(p. 8)

Shimberg (1990) reached the same conclusion. Others believe that at least for
teacher licensure, the State can be viewed as an employer (see Kuehn, Stallings, &
Holland, 1990). Freeman, Hess, and Kasik (1985) discuss why teacher licensure
may be unique. They suggest that:
the history of certification in most states indicates that certification has been
intimately interwoven in the employment process. (p. 14)

They argue further that:
Teaching as a profession is somewhat peculiar because teachers are certified or
licensed to work exclusively in institutions that are created, maintained, and more
or less financed by the state. (p. 23)

The above quote is not precisely true because many private school, parochial
school, and home school teachers are licensed. Nevertheless, some courts may
view it as a relevant argument.
Based, in part, upon the number of teacher certification test cases filed under
Title VII, and the number of employment testing cases cited as relevant precedent
in teacher certification test litigation, Kuehn, Stallings, and Holland (1990) believe
Title VII does apply to teacher licensure. They suggest that:
If the Courts treat teacher certificat ion tests as employee selection procedures, we
are compelled to construct them and defend them as employee selection procedures. (p. 2 I)
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The problem with the above quote is that it is widely recognized that licensure
tests serve different purposes from employment tests and this should result in
different test construction and validation procedures. One difference is that a
person is employed to do a specific job whereas a license allows the person to
engage in diverse jobs. Freeman et al. recognized this problem and concluded that:
examining certification requirements to determine their job-relatedness becomes
an almost hopeless task. ( 1985, p. 25)

The EEOC Un(form Guidelines address this whole issue, but the statements are
not decisive. The Guidelines state that "licensing and certification are covered ' to
the extent' that licensing and certification may be covered by Federal equal
employment opportunity law" (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
[EEOC], 1978, p. 38294). They further state that:
Voluntary certification boards, where certification is not required by law, are not
users ... with respect to their certifying functions and therefore are not subject to
these guidelines. If an employer relies upon such certification in making employment decisions, the employer is the user and must be prepared to justify, under
Federal law, that reliance as it would any other selection procedure. (1978, p.
38294)

Thus, if an employer used the results of a certification test for promotion, or
a differential salary , it would be used as an employment exam and be subject to
Title VII. For example, consider the proposed certification tests of the National
Board of Professional Teaching Standards. These are intended to be voluntary in
the sense that licensed teachers will not have to take them to maintain their licenses.
However, if a state or local district chose to reward certified teachers with
additional salary, that may be considered an employment decision and the Civil
Rights Acts (Title VII) might apply. But it would apply to the state or local unit
that uses the test for decision making.
The issue of the relevance of Title VII to licensure and certification tests is
important because Title VII calls for a business necessity requirement, which is
considered harder to demonstrate than the legitimate relationship requirement that
would otherwise apply to licensure tests. Because there is some disagreement about
whether (or under what circumstances) licensure and certification testing programs
are subject to the Civil Rights Acts requirements, this chapter discusses guidelines
for both types of settings. This author's view is that most licensure and certification
testing programs should not be ruled as employment programs, but others, used in
different fashions, might be.

PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS AND CODES
There are several sets of professional standards and codes that should be
cons idered when constructing a licensure or certification examination. The two
major ones are the Standardsfor Educational and Psychological Testing (American
Educational Research Association, American Psychological Association, & National Council on Measurement in Education [AERAI APA/NCMEJ, 1985), hereafter referred to as the Standards; and the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection
Procedures (EEOC, 1978), hereafter referred to as the Guidelines.
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Prior to discussi ng these standards and codes, it should be emphasized that both
the Standards and the Guidelines are somewhat dated. Both documents explicitly
recognize that they need to be interpreted keeping this datedness factor in mind.
The Standards 3 note that they are concerned "with a field that is evolving" (AERAI
APA/NCME, 1985 , p. 2) and the Guidelines point out that "they will have to be
interpreted in light of changing fac tual , legal, and professional circumstances"
(EEOC, 1978, p. 38292). In a later section , current psychometric views and
potential future directions in the field and how they may impact legal issues and
future revisions of the Standards and Guidelines are discussed.

AERAIAPAINCME Standards
The 1985 Standards constitute the fifth in a series of documents from the three
sponsoring organizations regarding the development and use of tests and they
supersede the previous documents.
In general, the Standards advocates that, within feas ible lim its, the necessary
techni cal information be made ava ilable so that those invo lved in policy debate
may be fully informed. The Standards does not attempt to provide psychometri c
answers to policy ques tions. (AERA/APA/NCME, 1985, p. I)

The Standards are divided into four parts. Part I covers technical standards for
test construction and evaluation. Included in this part are chapters on such topics
as validity, reliability, and norming, score comparability, and equating. Part II
covers standards for test use. The chapter on licensure and certification testing is
of major importance to readers of this volume although the chapter on employment
testing is mentioned. Part III covers standards for particular applications and the
chapter on testing the di sabled is particularly important. Finally, Part IV presents
standards for administrative procedures.
The Standards point out that their use in litigation is inevitable, but that
"professional judgment .. . always plays an essential role in determining the
relevance of particular standards in particular situations" (AERA/APA/NCME,
1985 , p. 2). Further, it is stressed that:
evaluat ing the acceptability of a test or test app lication does not rest on the literal
satisfaction of every primary standard in thi s document, and acceptability cannot
be determined by using a check list. (AERA/APA/NCME, 1985, p. 2)

Although the Standards represent an "official" guideline to be judgmentally
followed, it should be recognized that there is less than consensus in the psychometric
community about various components of the Standards. For example, regarding the
concept of test validity, Linn, comments on the Joint Committee's attempt
to carry this unified view of validity a bit furth er, but not, I mi ght add , without
signifi cant objection from a number of people .... A number of reviewers considered such a requirement to be overly demanding. (Linn, 1984, p. 4)

Shimberg has stated that the writers of the Standards did not obtain consensus "among all those who prepare and use licensing and certification tests
3The Slandards, like the Guidelin es, is a single work. However. For smooth ness in reading it also
will be treated as a plural no un .
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regarding what constitutes acceptable professional practice in these areas" (1990,
p. 13).

In spite of the above comments, the Standards are (correctly in my opinion)
used as a guide in the development of a licensure or certification test, and one
should try to follow the relevant standards. The subsections that follow discuss
some of the most pertinent standards from various chapters of the Standards.

Valid ity Standards
The validity chapter of the Standards states that "validity is the most important
consideration in test evaluation" (AERA/APA/NCME, 1985, p. 9) and presents 25
different standards regarding validity.
Certainly many of the standards in this chapter are relevant. However, it is
clear that not even all of these are relevant for any given test development/use
project. For example, in the validity chapter, Standard 1.1 states that "evidence of
validity should be presented for the major types of inferences for which the use of
a test is recommended" (AERA/APA/NCME, 1985, p. 13). By implication, and by
the comment following the standard, it is obvious that one would not have to gather
all the types of validity evidences that are addressed in the Standards for any
particular use. The separate chapters in Part II on various uses of tests make that
clear also.
Validity is a technical area where the field has changed its nomenclature, if
indeed not its approach . The Standards state that validity
refers to the appropriateness, meaningfulness, and usefulness of the specific
inferences made from test scores. Test validation is the process of accumu lating
evidence to support such inferences. (AERAI APA/NCME, 1985, p. 9)

Although, as the Standards point out, validity is a unitary concept, evidence
may be accumulated in many ways and psychometricians have traditionally
categorized the various ways into content-related, criterion-related, and constructrelated evidence of validity although "rigorous distinctions between the categories
are not possible" (p. 9). As the Standards suggest:
evidence identified usually with the criterion-related or content-related categories
... is relevant also to the construct-related category. (AERA/APA/NCME, 1985,
p.9)

Because content-related validity evidence is likely to be one type of validity
evidence that will be gathered, it seems important to consider the validity standards
that relate particularly to content-related evidence. Standard 1.3 relates indirectly
and Standard 1.6 directly to content-related evidence.
Standard 1.3: Whenever interpretation of subscores, score differences, or profiles
is suggested, the evidence justifying such interpretation shou ld be made explicit.
Where composite scores are deve loped, the basis and rationale for weighting the
subscores should be given. (Primary) (AERA/APA/NCME, 1985, p. 14).
Standard 1.6: When content-related evidence serves as a significant demonstration
of validity for a particular test use, a clear definition of the universe represented,
its relevance to the proposed test use, and the procedures followed in generating
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test content to represent that universe should be described . When the co ntent
sampling is intended to reflect criti cality rather than representativeness, the
rationale for the re lative emph as is given to critical factors in the universe should
also be described carefu ll y. (Primary) (AERA/APA/NCME, 1985 , p. 14)

The last sentence in the above quoted standard is particularly important
because, as will become more cl ear when discussing Chapter 11 of the Standards,
one often wi shes for a critical rather than representative domain in licensure testing.

Reliability Standards
The reliability chapter of the Standards presents 12 different standards. Some
of the more important reliability standards that should be attended to are as follows:
Standard 2. 1: For each total score, subscore, or combination of scores that is
reported, estimates of re levant reli abilities and standard errors of meas urement
should be provided ... (Primary) (p. 20)
Standard 2.10: Standard errors of measurement should be reported at critical score
levels. Where cut scores are specified for selection or classification, the standard
errors of measurement should be reported for score levels at or nea r the cut score.
(Secondary) (p. 22)
Standard 2. 12: For di chotomous decisions, estimates should be provided of the
percentage of test takers who are c lassified in the sa me way on two occasions or
on altern ate forms of the test. (Conditional) (AERAI APA/NCME, 1985, p. 23)

Test Development and Revision Standards
The chapter on test development and revision presents 25 different standards.
The standards primarily relate to building a test in a correct fashion. The major
overriding standard in this chapter is Standard 3. 1, which states that "Tests and
testing programs should be developed on a sound scientific bas is" (p. 25). Standard
3.2 states that the definition of the universe or domain must be described. Many
of the other standards in this chapter would also be appropri ate for li censure and
certification examinations.

Scaling , Norming, Score Comparability, and Equating Standards
It is certainly important that there be score co mparability and equating of tests
given at different times for licensure and certification exams, and the nine standards
presented in this chapter relevant to those issues should be considered in test
development. The standard most relevant for licensure tests is Standard 4.8 which
speaks to the content and statistical requirements for anchor test items if an anchor
test design is used for equating.

Setting the Cut Score
For licensure tests, the precision of the equating at the cut store is of primary
importance. There is no chapter in the Standards directly related to this issue and
the Standards do not make any recommendation regarding specific standard setting
procedures. However, they do suggest that the method and rationale of setting the
cut score, as well as the qualifications of the judges, should be documented (see
Standards 6.9 and 10.9).
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Standards Specific to Employment Testing
Chapter 10 of the standards is on employment testing. If a developer/user of
a licensure or certification test believes that it will be regarded by the courts as an
employment examination, then attention should be given to the standards in this
chapter. As mentioned above, this author does not consider licensure tests to be
employment tests, but some uses of certification tests (promotion, differential tasks
or differential salaries based on the tests) may place them in that category . The
major difference between the standards for employment testing and licensure and
certification testing is that employment testing standards place more emphasis on
criterion-related validity evidence.

Professional and Occupational Licensure and Certification Standards
Chapter 11 of the Standards focuses directly on professional and occupational
licensure and certification examinations. As the Standards point out, "several
hundred occupations are now regulated by state governments. Many other occupations are certified by nongovernmental agencies" (p. 63). The Standards discuss
the different purposes of employment and licensure examinations already discussed
in this book, and point out the implications of those differences for various issues
of validity. For licensure and certification, the focus is on necessary skills and
knowledge, whereas the employer may wish to maximize productivity. The
Standards make clear that:
Investigations of criterion -related validity are more problematic in the context
of li censure or certification than in many employment settings. Not all those
certified or licensed are necessarily hired; those hired are likely to be in a
variety of job assignments with many different employers, and some may be
self-employed. These factors often make traditional studies that gather criterion -related evidence of valid ity infeasible ... . For licensure and certification,
... primary reliance must usually be placed on content evidence ... " (AERA/APAI
NCME, 1985, p. 63)

Another distinction is that although an employment test typically should
cover the totality of the knowledge, skills, and abilities desirable on the job, the
content domain of a licensure test should be limited to the "knowledge and skills
necessary to protect the public" (p. 64). Note that "abilities" was left out of this
quote. Linn (1984) and Kane (1984) have made the same point. There is at least
some legal precedent to suggest that a licensure examination need not evaluate the
full range of skills desirable to practice a profession (Eisdorfer & Tractenberg,
1977, p. 119).
Although the Standards appropriately emphasize the importance of contentrelated validity evidence over criterion-related or construct validity evidence for
licensure tests, builders or users of licensure tests should not think they "have it
easy" in constructing licensure tests that meet the Standards. The requirements of
content validity are quite explicit and demanding.
Standard 11.1: The content domain to be covered by a licensure or certifi cation
test should be defined clearly and explained in terms of the importance of the
content for competent performance in an occupation. A rationale shou ld be
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provided to support a claim that the know ledge or ski lls being assessed are
required for competent perform ance in an occupation and are consistent with the
purpose fo r whi ch th e licens ing or certificat ion program was instituted . (Primary)
(AERA/APA/NCME, 1985, p. 64)

The comment for Standard 11.1 points out that "job analyses provide the
primary basis for defining the content domain," that "the emphasis for licensure and
certification is limited appropriately to knowledge and skill s necessary to protect
the public," and that "skills that may be important to success but are not directly
related to the purpose of li censure (i.e., protecting the public) should not be
included in a licensing exam" (AERA /APA/NCME, 1985, p. 64).
Two final standards from this chapter seem particularly relevant.
Standard 11 .4: Test takers who fail a test should, upon requ est, be to ld their score
and the minimum score required to pass the tes t. Test takers should be given
information on their perform ance in parts of the test for which separate scores or
reports are produced and used in the decis ion process. (Primary) (p. 65)
Stand ard 11.5: Rules and procedures used to combine scores or other assess ments
to determine the overall outco me should be reported to test takers preferably before
the test is administered. (Secondary) (AERA/APA/NCME, 1985, p. 65)

The comment for Standard 11.5 points out that:
In some cases candidates may be required to score above a specified minimum on
each of several tests. In other cases the pass-fai l decision may be based so le ly on
a total co mposite score. (AERAI APA/NCME, 1985 , p. 65)

These last two standards and the comment for Standard 11 .5 need to be
considered along with Standard 2. 1 quoted above. If the test is not unidimensional ,
the subscores provide potentially usefu l information for failing candidates who
wi sh to direct their subsequent rev iew and study to their areas of weakness. If these
subscores are reported for remediation purposes and are not used in a conjunctive
model but are simply used in a total composite score in a compensatory model, it
is debatabl e whether the scores have been used "in the decision process." They
have not been used in the licensure decision , but may be used by the fai led
candidate for remediation purposes. In writing specifically about teacher licensure
examinations , Mehrens has suggested that:
Because subscores are not typi call y used in teacher licensure decisions th ey would
not need to be reported. If they are reported they mi ght be used as stud y guides
by candidates who fa iled and thus it would be usefu l to report their reliabi li ties and
standard errors. T he re liabilities are freq uently low and candidates should
recog ni ze the ir limi tations as stud y guides . However, it should be stressed that low
subscore reliabilities are irrelevant in litigation regarding the legality of using the
total score for licensure decisions [emphas is added]. (1 990, p. 85)

It seems reasonable to generalize from thi s point to any licensure examination
use where the decision is based on a total composite score. One final point deserves
emphasis. The quoted comment accompanying Standard 11.5 suggests that it is
appropriate to base pass-fai l dec ision "solely on a total composite score." Although
this author agrees with that position, a common statement heard from expert
witnesses for plaintiffs is that one should not make a decision on only a single piece
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of data. Obviously, that stated opinion ignores the fact that there was probably a
sequential decision-making model employed req uiring other acceptable data on
additional variables prior to being allowed to sit for the licensure examination, and
it ignores this specific standard that specifically accepts making a decision solely
on a composite score.

Standards on Testing Individuals with Disabilities
Chapter 14 of the Standards presents eight standards for testing individuals
with disabilities. With the passing of the Americans with Disabilities Act (1990),
which became effective in 1992, there has been much discussion regarding what
accommodations need to be made for individuals with claimed disabilities. This
issue has been considered in depth in other publications. For example, Millman,
Mehrens, and Sackett address this issue for the New York Bar Examination in detail
(1993). Clearly, there is some obligation to allow individuals with physical
disabilities to be accommodated when the knowledge and skills needed for
licensure are not the specific physical skills which are being accommodated.
Probably the biggest areas of concern are with those who claim learning disabi lities.
These are hard to classify and most classification schemes result in a large number
of false positives. Whether correctly or incorrectly classified, there is the issue of
what is a fair accommodation for individuals with a cognitive disability when the
job in question demands cognitive functioning. The largest specific issue probably
relates to the amount of time extension that should be given to individuals with
disabilities. If the job in question demands primarily physical skills, then it would
be reasonable to grant accommodations to those with learning disabilities, but it
may not be reasonable to grant them to those with physical disabilities .
Some of the major points made in the eight standards are as follows:
Standard 14.1: People who modify tests for handicapped people should have
available to them psychometric expertise for so doing. (p. 79)
Standard 14.2: Until tests have been validated for people who have specific
handicapping conditions, test publishers shou ld issue cautionary statements in
manuals and elsewhere regarding confidence in interpretations based on such test
scores. (p. 79)
Standard 14.5: Empirical procedures should be used whenever possible to
estab li sh time limits for modified forms of timed tests rather than simply allowing
handicapped test takers a multiple of the standard time. (p.79)
Standard 14.6: When feasible, the val idity and reliability of tests adm inistered to
people with various handicapping conditions should be investigated and reported
by the agency or publisher that makes the modification. (AERA/APA/NCME,
1985 , p. 80)

EEOC Uniform Gu idelines
The Uniform Guidelines (EEOC, 1978) are a set of gu idelines on employee
selection procedures that have been adopted by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, the Civil Service Commission, the Department of Justice, and the
Department of Labor. In addition to being quite dated, there is, as has been
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mentioned, some debate about whether (or when) they might apply to licensure and
certification exams. As is stated:
These guidelines apply to tests and other selection procedures which are used as
a basis for any employment decision. Employment decisions include but are not
limited to hiring, promotion, demotion, membership (for example in a labor
organization), referral, retention, and licensing and certification, to the extent that
licensing and certification may be covered by Federal eq ual employ ment opportunity law. (EEOC, 1978, p. 38296)

They also state that:
Voluntary certi fication boards, where certification is not required by law, are not
users as defined ... with respect to their certifying functions and therefore are not
subject to these guidelines. If an employer relies upon such certification in making
employment decisions, the employer is the user and must be prepared to justify,
under Federal law, that reliance as it would any other selection procedure. (EEOC,
1978, p. 38294)

Whether or not the Guidelines apply in licensure, it is important to realize
that they "have been given great weight by the courts in Equal Protection as well
as Title VII cases" (Eisdorfer & Tractenberg, 1977, p. 121; see also, Rebell,
1990a, p. 347).
Under the Guidelines, to use a measure that produces adverse impact, the
employer
must justify the use of the procedure on grounds of 'business necessity.' This
normally means that it must show a clear relation between performance on the
selection procedure and performance on the job. (EEOC, 1978, p. 3829 1)

Although users need not validate procedures which do not have an adverse
impact,
if one way of using a procedure (e.g. ranking) results in greater adverse impact than
another way (e.g. pass/fail), the procedure must be va lidated for that use. (EEOC,
1978, p. 38294)

There are no major contradictions between the Guidelines and the Standards,
however, the Guidelines are more explicit than the Standards on some dimensions
(e.g., they require that any cutoff score be justified by reference to the "need for a
trustworthy and efficient work force" [EEOC, 1978, p. 38291], and that when
"cutoff scores are used, they should normally be set so as to be reasonable and
consistent with normal expectations of acceptable proficiency within the work
force" [ EEOC, 1978, p. 38298]). The Guidelines terminology of " normal expectations" clearly suggests a judgmental approach for setting a cutoff score. However, the Guidelines suggest that rank ordering requires substantial evidence of
validity and a reasonable expectation that small differences in scores would reflect
real differences in job performance.
The Guidelines address the three types of validity evidence and state that
" users may rely upon criterion-related validity studies, content validity studies or
construct validity studies" (EEOC, 1978, p. 38298). They recognize the lack of a
clear distinction between types of validity ev idence and try to address the borderline
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between content validity and construct validity. As an example, the Guidelines
state that for typing, a typing test:
is justi fiable on the basis of content va lidity because it is a sample of an important
or critical part of the job ... but [the Guidelines ) do not allow the validatio n of a test
measuring a construct such as "judgment" by a content va lidity strategy. (EEOC,
1978, p. 38292)

Other quotes from the Guidelines relevant to validity are as follows:
Any validity study should be based upon a rev iew of informati on about the job for
which the selecti on proced ure is to be used. (p. 38300)
A selection procedure can be supported by a content validity strategy to the extent
th at it is a representati ve sample of the content of the job. (p. 38302)
A selection procedure based upon inferences about mental processes ca nnot be
supported sole ly or primarily on the bas is of content va lidity. (EEOC, 1978, p.
38302)

Finally, it should be mentioned that the Guidelines stress the importance of
record keeping and documentation .
Users of selecti on procedures .. .should maintain and have available for each job
info rmati on on adverse impact of the selecti on process fo r that job and, where it
is determined a selection process has an adverse impact, evidence of va lidi ty ... Where
a total selecti on process for a job has an adverse impact, the user shoul d maintain
and have available records or other inform ati on showing whi ch components have
an adverse impact. (EEOC, 1978, 38303).

STATE AND FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS
There are differences in case law and test construction processes between
employment and licensure testing and the case law precedents will be discussed
separately. For each type of test, some of the pivotal cases are identified and what
made those cases important is described. In generalizing from the rulings in these
cases, it should be pointed out that a legal case is binding only on lower courts in
the same jurisdiction . For example, Federal Supreme Court rulings are binding on
all other Federal Courts, but an Appeals Court ruling in, for instance, the 5th Circuit
would be binding only on lower courts in that circuit. Also, the decisions are
binding only on cases that are fac tuall y simil ar. Nevertheless, even cases not
binding may be broadly instructive.

Employment Cases
The Griggs v. Duke Power Company case (1971) was the first landmark case
dealing with job-related testing. The court ruled that in employment testing in
private industry the defendants must show the job relatedness of the test. "Broad
and general testing dev ices ... as fixed measures of capacity" were barred in
employment testing (Griggs, 1971 , p. 433). In Albermarle Paper Company v.
Moody (1 975), it was held that the EEOC Guidelines (revised in 1978) were the
fundamental benchmark for assessing Titl e VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act job
relatedness requirements . These Guidelines constituted the admini strative interpre-
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tation of the act by the enforcing agency and "consequently are entitled to great
deference" (Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 1971,401 U.S., at 433-434). Chance
v. Board of Examiners (1972) established ajob relatedness precedent for tests used
with public employees as well as private employees.
Thus, it is clear that employers can be challenged regarding the job-relatedness
of their employment practices. When challenged, employers must show that their test
development procedures followed acceptable professional practices, with the EEOC
Guidelines being considered an important guide. However, in Guardians Association
of N. Y. City v. Civil Service Commission (1980), the court ruled that the Guidelines
adopted too rigid an approach in the selection of validation techniques and that it was
inconsistent with Title VII's endorsement of professionally developed tests. The
Court basically considered content vaHdation strategies to be acceptable for a test that
assessed observable abilities. The court stated that content validation should not be
rejected just because the abilities measured could be classified as constructs.
In an earlier decision (Washington v. Davis, 1976) the Supreme Court accepted
the use of a verbal skill s test for entry into police training even though its use had
adverse impact because the scores correlated with performance in the training
program and that training program completion is a prerequisite to employment. It
should be mentioned that:
Title VII standards were not app lied in Washington v. Davis because the statute
was not app licable to federal employees when the case was initially fi led. (Cohen,
1989, p. 240)

However, the Court commented that had the job-relatedness requirements of
Griggs or Albermarle Paper been applied, the correlation with the training program
would have been sufficient validation.
In a fairly recent court decision (Richardson v. Lamar County Board of
Education, 1989, 1991) a school district was challenged for using the Alabama
Initial Teacher Certification Test. This test was originally intended as a licensure
examination. Thus, although the case was technically an employment case, it may
have implications for licensure examinations. The judge ruled against the district's
use of the test. Judge Thompson's decision contained a fairly extensive analysis of
perceived problems in test development and standard setting processes in the
Alabama Initial Teacher Certification Test. Judge Thompson ruled that:
first try failure statistics can be used for determining the extent of
adverse impact because initial failure is a discrete injury (even though
another court had previously ruled otherwise-see United States v.
LULAC, 1986);
outside experts should have been retained to monitor the test developer's
work;
all items should have been reviewed by committee members and
suggested changes in items should not have been ignored by the test
developer;
the developer should have conducted empirical bias studies (even
though for many of the tests the sample sizes were small);
• the cut scores were too high;

2. LEGAL AND PROFESSIONAL BASES

47

failure to use a backup cut score method was not unprofessional;
a developer may change methodology across time without this constituting an admission of error; and
a court should not eschew an idealistic view of test validity evidence,
but neither should it apply an "anything goes" approach.
Although this author does not agree with all of Judge Thompson 's interpretations of the data in the case, the ruling does suggest that test developers should carry
out their test con struction tasks very carefully .
Two recent U.S. Supreme Court rulings relate to the requirements for subjective assessments. Basically , the rulings in both cases were that nonobjective
assessments are subj ect to legal scrutiny under the disparate impact analysis of Title
VII. In Watson v. Fo rt Worth Bank and Trust (1 988), it was ruled that the Griggs
standards would apply to subj ective testing processes such as interviews. The court
wished to prevent employers from circumventing the Griggs standard by replacing
tests with subj ective assessments. However, there was sharp di spute among the
Justices on how to apply the standards. A plurality of the court said the standards
should be applied in a less rigorous manner in subj ective testing. In the Wards Co ve
Packing Co. v. Atonia (19 89), a majority of the court agreed to less rigorous
standards. Rebell (1990b) has suggested that:
•

The net effect of Watson/Ward s Cove might be said to constitute a broadening of
Title VII 's reach but also a modification of its bite. (p. 5)

Nevertheless, courts will not accept an "anything goes" approach in subj ective
assess ments. (See the discussion in the next section of a licensure case [Musgrove
et ai. v. Board of Education for the State of Georgia et al.l, which was a case
involving a subjective assess ment process.)

Licensure Cases
Licensure testing may involve a conflict between two rights: social and
individual. The tension between societal and individual rights is both a legal and
a moral issue (McDonQugh & Wolf, 1988). No one denies that the public has a
legitimate right to have competent individuals practicing in various occupations and
profess ions. No one denies that individuals have the right to be protected from
unfair employment practices. The trade-off between the two is where the controversy lies.
As mentioned, there is debate about the applicability of the Civil Rights Acts
to licensure tests. However, there is a stro ng constitutional bas is for licensing.
Reeves (1 984) states that:
T he constitutionality of requirements to take and pass qu alifying examinati ons is
firml y entrenched. (p. 65)

This basis is stated in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar (1 975) as follow s:
The States have a compelling interest in th e practi ce of professions within their
boundari es, and that as part of the ir power to protect the publi c health, safety, and
other va lid interests they have broad power to establish standards fo r licensing
practitioners and reg ul ating the practice of professions. (p. 792)
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Although a constitutional basis is well established, licensure tests must have a
rational relationship to the occupation. However, as mentioned, this is relatively
easy to establi sh.
There are several court precedents for licensure. Most of these are for licensure
to the Bar although in recent years there have been several teacher licensure cases.
We begin our review of licensure cases with a very early decision on the licensure
of doctors. In Dent v. State of West Virginia (1881), ruling in favor of the licensure
requirement, the court declared, in part:
The power of the state to provide for the ge neral welfare of its people authorizes
it to prescribe all such regulations as in its judgment will secure or tend to secure
them against the co nseq uences of ignorance and incapacity, as well as of deception
and fraud .... The nature and extent of the qualifications required must depend
primarily upon the judgment of the state as to their necessi ty. If they are
appropriate to the calling or profession, and attainable by reasonable study or
app lication, no objection to their va lidity can be raised because of their stringency
or difficulty. (1881 , p. 114)

In a massive review of the literature, Eisdorfer and Tractenberg (1977)
suggested that: "In the post-1937 period, the standard of review has become even
more relaxed than that stated in the Dent case" (p. 117).
Given the thorough review by Eisdorfer and Tractenberg in their 1977
chapter, this review jumps to a more recent case: United States v. State of North
Carolina (1975, 1977). The United States brought a Title VII complaint against
North Caro lina for requiring a minimum score on the National Teacher Examination (NTE). The court record revealed that at least one teacher training institute
had
graduated functional illiterates and the court acknowledged that the state should
have "the right to adopt academic requirements and written ach ievement tests
designed and validated to disclose the minimum amount of knowledge necessary
to effective teaching." However, the NTE was not designed for use in assessing
inservice teachers, the cut-off score chosen was not validated for job performance,
and the res ult was a disparate impact on blacks. (Cohen, 1989, p. 239)

The court ruling was vacated in 1977 following the Supreme Court's ruling in
Washington v. Davis regarding correlation with training programs and because a
validation study was conducted for the NTE in North Carolina.
The Tyler v. Vickery (1975 , 1976) case was a chall enge against the constitutionality of the Georgia Bar Examination. The decision is important for several
reasons. First, as mentioned , it rejected the view that the EEOC Guidelines were
appropriate for a bar examination. Related to cutoff scores it was ruled that:
While the minimum passing score of 70 has no sig nifi cance standing alone, it
represents the examiners' cons idered judgment as to " minimum competence
required to practice law." (p. 1102)

The court also rejected the plaintiffs ' complaint that the examinations did not
cover the full range of ski lls needed to practice law and it held that no review
procedure was necessary because there was an opportunity to retake the examination within a reasonable time.
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An important early teacher licensure case was the United States v. the State of
South Carolina (1977, 1978). In thi s case, it was ruled that the National Teacher
Examination (NTE) could be used for both teacher certification (licensure) and
determination of salary levels. This case followed Washington v. Davis, and the NTE
was validated against teacher training programs and not actual job performance. It was
held that the content validity study was adequate under Title VII (and constitutional)
guidelines. One way this case differed from the original (prior to vacating) North
Carolina case was that the state did both an extensive cutoff score study and content
validation study. Cohen (1989) has concluded that:
When teacher certificati on tests are profess ionally developed in good faith to
insure teacher competency and are then validated as to content, they will be uphe ld
by courts. The public interest in having at least minimally co mpetent teachers
seems to outweigh the di sparate impact that has often resulted. (p. 242)

An Alabama teacher licensure case was an example of a prolonged, complex
litigation. A Basic Profess ional Studies Test and 45 tests for different teaching
specializations were constructed and administered by the National Evaluation Systems
(NES). A class action suit was brought against the state on behalf of all AfricanAmericans who had been (or would be) denied certification because of failure to pass
the tests. After considerable discussion, a settlement was approved by the court.
Subsequently , the Alabama State Board of Education wished to back out of the
settlement. After much legal manipUlation, the United States Court of Appeals ruled
that the original agreement was enforceable. The settlement incorporated the idea of
the Golden Rule (1 980) settlement that required items with minimum racial differences to be used first in any test. (The Golden Rule approach to choosing items has
been almost unanimously viewed by measurement professionals as one that will result
in psychometrically inferior examinations.) At any rate, the Alabama case was
decided on procedural grounds rather than on the merits of the proposed certification
programs. Nevertheless, while the settlement issue was being debated in the courts,
the case was tried on its merits, but the judge never issued a ruling. Although the
Richardson employment case discussed earlier may provide some clues regarding how
the judge might have ruled, it is possible that previous legal precedent for licensure
cases may have caused the judge to rule differently in a licensure case than he would
have in the employment case.
Two licensure cases with important implications for testing are the State of Texas
v. Proj ect Principle (1 987), and United States v. LULA C (1986). In the Project
Principle case, use of the Texas Examination of Current Administrators and Teachers
(TECAT) was ruled constitutional. It was held that there was no impair ment of a
contract ri ght because teaching certificates are licenses, not contracts; state legislatures
may change licensing requi rements retroactively ; and that teacher testing was a
rational means of achieving legitimate State objectives, hence was not fundamentally
unfair. Also, it was ruled that due process was not violated because applicants had a
right to retake the test prior to being decertified. The court ruled that:
teac her tes ting is a rati onal mea ns of achi ev ing the legitimate state objective of
ensuring that public school educators meet specified standards of competency.
( 1987, p. 391)
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In the LULAC case, the use of the Pre-Professional Skills Test (PPST) was
upheld. The court noted that the state had considered other alternative tests before
selecting the PPST, and that a validation study had been conducted which surveyed
Texas educators regarding their beliefs about whether the skills measured by the
PPST were necessary for success in teacher education programs and in teaching.
The court agreed with the Washington v. Davis (1976) decision that a test only need
show a relationship to the effects of a required training program, not the eventual
competence of individuals on the job. Further, as noted earlier, the court held that
because applicants are permitted to retake the test, and that the passing rate for
minority-group students was increasing, "the ultimate impact of the PPST on the
number of minority teachers in the State has not been assessed" (United States v.
Lulac, 1986, p. 643). With respect to the issue of due process, the court held that
the legislative process gave adequate notice:
When the legislature enacts a law, or a state agency adopts a regulation, that affects
a general class of persons, all of those persons have received procedural due
process by the legislative process itself and they have no ri ght to individual
attention. (United States v. Lutac, 1986, p. 647)

Finally, the court ruled that institutions of higher education were not required
to lower standards to accommodate students who had been inadequately educated
due to the state's historical dual school system.
In administering its higher ed ucation systems ... a state ... has no constitutional or
statutory obligation to suspend or lower valid academic standards to accommodate
hi gh school students who may be ill-prepared because of prior constitutional
violations by its local and elementary school systems (United States v. Lutac,
1986, p. 70 15).

Musgrove et at. v. Board of Education for the State of Georgia, et al. (1991)
was a case involving use of the Teacher Performance Assessment Instrument·
(TPAI) for teacher licensure. Several points were made in that ruling that have
important implications for licensure testing. One issue pertained to the rule that
candidates were only allowed six attempts to pass the test. The court ruled that:
a [sic] irrebuttable lifetime presumption of unfitness after failure to pass six
"TPAI"s was arbitrary and capricious because no furt her education, training,
experience, maturity or higher degree would enable such persons to become
certified in Georgia. (Musgrove , 1991 , p. 3).

Further, the court found that two competencies ("Interpersonal Skills" and
"Helps Learners Develop Positive Self-Concepts") had indicators that were "so
vague, ambiguous, indefinite, arbitrary and subjective as to fail to place a reasonable person on notice of the standards of conduct expected" (Musgrove, 1991 , p.
6). This court ruling focused on a performance instrument that had been carefully
constructed and heavily researched. Those who are developing performance
assessment instruments for high-stakes decisions should consider this court decision very carefully.
Although the ruling not limiting the number of attempts to six is different from
those to be discussed in the next paragraph, consideration should be given regarding
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whether additional education should result in additional attempts being permitted.
Performance standards should be defined with great care to minimize the possibility
of their being considered vague, arbitrary, and subjective.
Four courts have ruled in favor of limiting the number of chances an individual
may have to take an exam. In Younger v. Colorado State Board of Law Examiners
(1980) the court ruled in favor of limiting the number of examinations to three, and
in Poats v. Givan (1981) a rule limiting the number of times an applicant could sit
for the bar exam to four was declared legal. In Jones v. Board of Commissioners
(1984) an Alabama rule limiting the number of times an applicant could take the
bar exam did not create an irrebuttable presumption of incompetence. In Yu v.
Clayton (1986) it was ruled that an RN applicant who had failed a licensure exam
six times was ineligible for another chance until after recompleting an entire course
of nursing studies. These four rulings are at odds with the Musgrove decision cited
earlier.
Several other cases are worthy of brief mention. One relates to the review of
exams. In Balaklaw v. American Board of Anesthesiology, Inc. (1990) a plaintiff
who failed brought suit requesting he be allowed to review his exam and answer
sheet. The request was denied. This ruling was similar, in this respect, to the Tyler
v. Vickery decision mentioned earlier.
Finally, in Millet v. Hoisting Engineers' Licensing Div. it was ruled, for an oral
exam, that:
Failure to keep a record of the questions and answers has been held to be a
constituti onal violation because this deprives the failed applicant of any chance of
showing that the examination was irrational and arbitrary or that the grading was
in error. (1977, I 17 I)

Conclusions Regarding Court Decisions
A general conclusion seems to be that if tests are constructed according to
procedures advocated in the Guidelines and Standards, they should withstand legal
scrutiny. For employment cases, the key issue is validity. Rossein summarizes case
law as follows:
Courts readily uphold an employment practice if the employer can show that the
practice actually enables the employer to screen out unqualified or less qualified
candidates. (1992, p. LI)

The issue, of course, is what kinds of, and how much, evidence is required.
Content validity evidence has generally been considered sufficient. For example, in
Jones et at. v. New York City Human Resources Administration (1975) it was stated
that no case in that Circuit had held that criterion-related evidence was required to
prove job-relatedness.
Although, the Court argued in the Richardson decision that it should not
eschew an idealistic view of test validity nor apply an "anything goes" approach,
it is clear that the decision employed standards on the idealistic side of a middle
position. That can perhaps be seen most clearly by looking specifically at the cut
score issue. In general, the courts have accepted judgments regarding the cut score.
In Tyler v. Vickery (1975) the court ruled that the cut score had been validated even
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though there was no empirically demonstrated evidence because the score represented the examiners' "considered judgments" as to minimum competence required. In Guardians Association the exam was ruled as invalid, but regarding the
cut score the court stated that:
As with rank-ordering, a criterion-re lated study is not necessarily required: the
e mployer mi ght establi sh a valid cutoff score by using a profess ional estimate of
the req ui site ability levels, or, at the very least, by ana lyzing the test res ults to
locate a logica l "breakpoint" in the distribution of scores . (from Byham, 1983, p.
J07)

Pyburn (1984) concluded that a state may set the passing grade where it
chooses because it is empowered to require high standards. He references Schware
v. Board of Bar Examiners of State of New Mexico (1957) and Chance v. State Bar
of California (1967). The Dent decision was quoted above. Although all these
cases suggest that professional judgment is acceptable as a means of setting cut
scores, if a judge is convinced the cut scores are too hi gh, the ruling may be
unfavorable. In the Richardson case discussed earlier, the court ruled that:
the developer' s procedure yielded cut scores that were so astoundingly high that they
signaled, on their face, an absence of correlation to minimum competence. ( 1989, p. 28)
an inference as to competence will be mea nin gless if the cut score, o r decision
point, of the test does not also refl ect what practitioners in the field deem to be a
minimally com.petent level ofper!onnance on that test. Again, the test developer's
role in setting a cut score is to apply professionally accepted techniques that
accurately marshal the judgment of practitioners. (1989, p. 32)

One interesting point about the above quotes is that the judge seemed to
support judgmental methods. Yet, when the test developers did apply what some
supported as a professionally accepted technique, the judge contended that the cut
scores were "astoundingly high." Certainly the attempt by the test constructors was
to marshal the judgment of practitioners. Experts for the defendants did not believe
the cut scores were too high. However, experts for the plaintiffs argued that the
standards were too high. The judge obviously agreed.
Rebell, in discussing three recent challenges that were settled or withdrawn,
pointed out the very high pass rate for these tests. As he suggested:
To the ex tent that fear of judicial interventi on caused a lowering of otherwi se val id
and appropriate cut scores, increased court involvement in evaluatio n matters is a
worrisome prospect. ( 1990a, p. 35 1)

Thus, although some judges will set very high (unrealistic?) standards for test quality,
the bulk of the case law suggests most judges are reasonable in their expectations and
rulings. In concluding this section, it seems appropriate to quote Pybum:
To date, there have been very few successful challenges to licensing examin ation s
on the g rounds that the tests were "d iscriminatory" or were not "rationally related"
to the purpose for whi ch they were being used. (1990, p. 14)

FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The Guidelines are quite out of date, but no revision is being planned; the
Standards are somewhat dated and a revision is being planned; the 199 1 Civil
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Rights Act, at the time of this writing, has had little chance to impact court rulings;
and the Watson and Wards Cove rulings regarding subj ective assessments are too
recent to have had much impact on subsequent rulings. Thus, a variety of factors
may impact how one should construct licensure tests and how courts may rule on
their legality. Although the future is always difficult to predict, some discussion
of possible future directions seems worthwhile.

New Standards
T he revision of the Standards is being planned and, by the time thi s book is
published, the individuals on the committee will be appointed and specific changes
for the Standards will likely have been proposed. No revised standards are
anticipated before 1996. As was mentioned, there was not total agreement among
psychometricians regarding the 1985 Standards. Some thought they were not
"tough" enough whereas others thought they set unreali stically high standards.
Whether the revised standards will be more or less rigorous regarding tests used for
licensure or certification will depend , in part, upon the views of the particular
individuals appointed to the committee.
Although the political/social interests and psychometric views of the individuals on the new Standards committee will likely have an impact on the Standards,
just what that impact will be is unknown. What is known is that some views of the
psychometric profession have changed and there is likely some general agreement
on the wi sdom of the changes. The 1985 Standards pred icted some specific areas
where
new developments are particularly likely, such as gender-specific or combinedgender norms, cultural bias, computer based test interpretations, validity generali zation, differential predi ction, and fl agg ing test scores for people with handi capping
conditions. (AERA/APAINCME, 1985, p. 2)

Some of these new developments have been influenced by legislation. For
example, the Civil Rights Act of 199 1 prohibits ethnic or gender norming for
employment tests. Some of the other areas have not developed as much as was
surmi sed when the 1985 Standards went to print.
In my view, the major writings likely to influence the revised Standards are in
the area of validity. As reported earlier, there was a movement in the 1985
Standards to unify the notion of validity under the heading of construct validity.
There has been continued writing in that area and the new Standards may well go
further in that unifying direction than the current ones do. Whether there will be any
major changes in the methodologies used to establish validity is more questionable.
In my view, the methodol ogies available for gathering validity evidence have not,
in fact, expanded much . One is still likely to use the methodologies that heretofore
have been referred to as content, criterion-related, and construct validity evidences.
There may, in fact, be a change in that all these methodologies are referred to as
providing evidence regarding the construct validity of the measures.
In addition to wishing to call all validity construct validity, there has been some
suggestion that the notion of validity should extend beyond the accuracy of
inferences made from the scores to encompass the social consequences of testing
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(Messick, 1989; Shepard, 1993). It is unclear at the time of this writing whether that
expansion of the meaning of the word "validity" will be widely accepted by the
measurement community. For example, Wiley (1991) prefers to focus on the
psychological processes intended to be measured rather than the use of the tests. In
general, there is some concern that broadening the concept of validity into a
consideration of social concerns will cause it to lose some of its scientific meaning.
Nevertheless, whether consequences of test use become a part of the connotation of
"validity," the measurement community has long noted the importance of considering
the costs of false positives and false negatives and the new Standards are almost sure
to emphasize the consideration of these costs more explicitly. It is hard to imagine that
the costs of false positives would be taken lightly for licensure decisions.

New Legislation
Some aspects of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Americans with
Disabilities Act have been discussed. Because both are reasonably recent, there is
little legal precedent regarding what the impact of these will be. In this author's
view, there will be little impact on licensure from the Civil Rights Act of 1991
because it relates primarily to employment testing and it basically reaffirms the
business necessity requirement that was the basis for many of the previous
decisions . The only two decisions that would have allowed for a lessening of the
business necessity requirement were the Watson and the Wards Cove cases. There
will likely be some consideration of the Americans with Disabilities Act in the new
Standards. Whether or not that occurs, test constructors and test users do need to
attend to the necessity of providing appropriate accommodations for individuals
with documented disabilities.

Subjective Assessments
Although portions of the Watson and Wards Cove cases have been made
impotent as precedents due to the 1991 Civil Rights Act, the act did not address
the issue of subjective assessments. It is reasonable to assume that many more
cases will arise where subjective assessments are being challenged. Both Rebell
(1990b) and Phillips (1993) have pointed out that the testing issues in Watson
were less complex than those posed by some of the currently proposed performance tasks .
The question remaining is whether it is reasonable and technically feasible to apply
the EEOC Guidelines to sllch performance (subjective) tasks. (Phillips, 1993, p.
735)

It is too soon to know how demanding the courts will be regarding the
psychometric properties of subjective assessments. However, it would seem that
the psychometric community would desire high quality assessments whether they
be considered objective or subjective. Thus, one should not anticipate support from
the psychometric community for subjective assessments that have low reliability,
low validity, inadequate equating procedures, etc. (It is true that the specific
operational definitions of validity and reliability may be somewhat different for
subjective assessments.)
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SUMMARY
The general legal setting within which employment and licensure tests are
judged has been described in thi s chapter. Generic legal issues include the
constitutional requirements (primarily of the 14th Amendment) and the statutory
requirements of the Civil Rights Acts. Basically the Constitution requires equal
protection and due process. The Civ il Rights Acts prohibit disparate treatment and
disparate impact.
A distinction was made between employment and licensure/certification testing. The purposes of these types of testing are quite differe nt and logically should
lead to different test development procedures. There is some uncertainty about
whether the Civil Rights Acts and the EEOC Guidelines are applicable to licensure
tests. This is an important issue because the Civil Rights Acts call for a business
necessity requirement, which is considered harder to demonstrate than the legiti mate relationship requirement that the 14th Amendment calls for.
The more relevant portions of a variety of professional standards and codes for
licensure tests were summarized. Although both the AERAIAPA/NCME Standards and the EEOC Guidelines are somewhat dated, they have been used
extensively in previous court cases (the Guidelines for employment tests) and, thus,
there is some legal precedent based on these standards.
Several of the more important employment and licensure court decisions were
discussed. In general, it would appear that hi gher test development/validation
standards have been set for employment decisions than for licensure decisions. The
courts have accepted a variety of kinds of validity ev idence and are (generally)
reluctant to second-guess cut scores that have been established by obtaining the
judgments of individuals in the profess ion/occupation in question.
Future directions with respect to legal precedents will be somewhat dependent
upon the upcoming revi sion of the Standards. It is unclear what recent legislation
such as the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Americans with Disabilities Act will
have on court dec isions. Basicall y, the new C ivil Rights Act reaffirms the business
necessity requirement that was the basis for many previous decisions. T he
Americans with Disabilities Act may result in increased accommodations for those
with claimed di sabilities. The movement to more subjective based assessments
coupled with the Watson and Wards Cove rulings that subj ective assessments are
subject to test development standards should result in some interesting court cases.
Although an agency can always be sued, and one can never predict how a judge
will rule, there has been enough precedent to suggest that if one develops an exam
with professional care, there should be a good chance that the test will be declared
legally acceptable.
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